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Recent Decisions on Damages
In Commercial Cases in California
By JUDSON A. CRANE*
Much attention is given by the Bar to damages in certain tort cases.
There are associations of Claimants' Attorneys, of Trial Attorneys and
there may be associations of Defense Counsel. How to try or defend
a personal injury action, how to build up or limit recovery of damages
in such actions is being well publicized. Comparatively little attention
is given to damages arising out of commercial transactions. It seems
appropriate to call to the notice of the Bar and of law students sig-
nificant recent decisions showing trends and developments in respect
to recoverable damages in actions other than personal injuries and
trespasses to property. The writer in connection with teaching courses
in damages in the past six years has noted a number of significant de-
cisions by the California appellate courts which wil be discussed in
this article.
Foreseeability of Harm
The basic rule for the recovery of damages in contract action is
provided by Civil Code section 3300:
Measure of damages for breach of contract. For the breach of an
obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except
where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which
will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately
caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things would be
likely to result therefrom.
This is substantially the rule laid down in the leading English case
of Hadley v. Baxendale1 if we may consider "detriment proximately
caused" as including "injuries which the defendant had reason to fore-
see as a probable result of his breach when the contract was made."2
Many cases have held that damages within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contracting are to be considered proximate.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, A.B. 1905,
Brown University; LL.B. 1909, Harvard; S.J.D. 1915, Harvard; editor, CRaNE, CASES ON
DAmAGEs (3rd ed. 1955); member, Mass. and Penn. bars.
1 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
2 RE STATEmENT, CoNTAc-s § 330 (1932).
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Holmestake Mining Company v. Talcott3 allowed recovery of profits
lost to plaintiff by defendant's breach of a contract to supply ore to
be milled, as being within the contemplation of the parties and rea-
sonably certain.
Csordas v. United States Tile & Composition Roofers,4 allowed
recovery for loss of profits on a roofing job against a labor organization
which in breach of contract supplied an unskilled employee, making
it necessary to do the work over again. The court treated the loss as
damages which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to re-
sult, citing Civil Code section 3300.
Arvin-Kern Company v. B. J. Service, Inc.5 allowed recovery for
harm caused by use of a defective cementing tool for use in oil well
drilling, citing Civil Code section 3300.
Ely v. Bottini6 allowed recovery by a main contractor against a
subcontractor for damages caused by the latter's delay in completion,
the court citing Civil Code section 3300, and Hadley v. Baxendale, ap-
plying the "contemplation of parties" rule.
Christensen v. Slawter7 allowed recovery by a purchaser of a tract
of land for the purpose of erecting houses for damages caused by delay
in making conveyance. Time was expressly made of the essence. The
vendor was aware of vendee's purposes. Hadley v. Baxendale was cited
in a discussion of the contemplation of parties rule.
A line of cases has dealt with the liability of a liability insurance
carrier who in bad faith violation of its contract to defend the insurer
fails to settle for an amount within the policy coverage and exposes
the insured to a judgment by an injured plaintiff for an amount in
excess of the policy.
Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Companys reversed the judgment
of the superior court sustaining a demurrer to the complaint by the
insured, and set forth some seven matters to be considered in passing
on whether the insurer is guilty of such bad faith in dealing with
proposals for settlement as to amount to breach of the contract of
insurance.
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Company9 upheld a
finding below that the insurer in refusing a reasonable offer of settle-
3 161 Cal. App. 2d 566, 327 P.2d 59 (1958).
4 177 Cal. App. 2d. .. 2 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1960).
5 178 Cal. App. 2d. . 3 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1960).
6 179 Cal. App. 2d.... 3 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1960).
7 173 Cal. App. 2d 325, 343 P.2d 341 (1959).
8 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69, 66 A.L.R. 2d 1202 (1958); See also Ivy v.
Pacific Automobile Insurance Co. 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958).
950 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 58 A.L.R. 2d 883 (1958); Accord Bell v. Com-
mercial Insurance Co., 280 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1960).
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ment within the amount of the policy was guilty of bad faith and
breach of contract, and was liable for the full amount of the recovery
by the injured person. The loss to the insured was held to have been
proximately caused by the breach of contract, under Civil Code sec-
tion 3300.
Davy v. Public National Insurance Company'0 affirmed a judgment
of the superior court to the effect that there was no sufficient proof of
bad faith. It was held that negligence alone on the part of the insurer
is not conclusive of bad faith. It seems clear that the insured who tries
to impose liabilty on the insurer for more than the amount of his policy
must prove something more than the refusal to make a compromise
settlement for an amount within the policy limits. He has to establish
that the refusal to settle was unreasonable. As that depends on what
information was gained by the insurer from its investigations and a
guess as to what a jury might find on the issues of liability and damages.
The insured who does not carry enough coverage is seemingly in a
risky position.
Navarro v. Jeffries" was an action for breach of a contract to supply
the plaintiff with castings to be made into finished truck oil pans and
returned to defendant. The defendant ceased to supply castings. Plain-
tiff was allowed to recover lost profits on the unfinished portion of the
contract and also depreciation of special equipment procured by plain-
tiff for the purpose of performance, the court citing Civil Code sec-
tion 3300.
Reynolds v. Bank of America National T. & S. Association 12 sus-
tained recovery by the bailor of an airplane not only for cost of re-
placement, but also for loss of use during the time it took to procure
a replacement. Plaintiff was in the business of renting airplanes. De-
fendant's testator had by negligent operation been compelled to ditch
the plane in the ocean and it was a total loss. The loss of use was held
to be a proximately caused detriment whether it could have been antic-
ipated or not, under Civil Code section 3333, which provides a rule
for damages for obligations not arising out of contract. It would seem
the same result might have been reached in an action for breach of
the bailee's contract to return the plane in good condition.
Often where the plaintiff has an election to treat his cause of action
as a tort or a breach of contract, greater damages may be recovered
under tort measures of damages. In Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Her-
bert's the cause of action was a breach of an agreement to supply
10 181 Cal. App. 2d ... , 5 Cal. Reptr. 488 (1960).
"1181 Cal. App. 2d..., 5 Cal. Reptr. 435 (1960).
12 53 Cal. 2d 49, 345 P.2d 926 (1959).
13 54 Cal. 2d .... 353 P.2d 294, 5 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1960).
water. Treating the wrong as a tort, damages were allowed for the
mental suffering of the plaintiff, occupying a dwelling dependent on
the water supply; moreover, the wrong being malicious, punitive dam-
ages were also recoverable.
Avoidable Consequences
A victim of a breach of contract cannot recover damages for harm
he could have avoided by reasonable effort after knowledge of the
breach. It is sometimes stated in judicial opinions that the plaintiff is
under a duty to mitigate damages. This is incorrect. He is rather under
a disability to recover compensation for harm he could have avoided. 14
He is not held at his peril to take the safer course, but, only having a
choice of conduct, he must use ordinary diligence and adopt a course
which is reasonable as of the time he acts.15 If defendant indicates
that he desires to cancel an executory contract, but the manifestation
is not clear and explicit, the plaintiff may be acting reasonably in going
ahead with full performance, rather than take the risk of liability for
non-performance if there was found to have been no repudiation." If,
however, there is a clear and definite repudiation, the plaintiff is barred
from recovery for the breach to the extent of savings that would have
resulted from his cessation of performance.'
7
On breach by a subcontractor on a construction contract where
time of completion is essential, the main contractor need not re-
advertise and seek other bids, but may award the work to the next
highest bidder at an additional cost, the difference showing the amount
of damage.'
8
On breach by a seller of a contract to deliver a quantity of specific
wine, approved by the buyer, the latter need not accept an offer by
the seller to substitute wine of an inferior quality.' 9
On notification by a shipper of intention to ship cotton to be car-
ried from the West Coast to India of a lesser quantity than had been
contracted for with the carrier, the latter made other contracts for
other kinds of goods to be carried in the vacated cargo space. Damages
recoverable from the shipper for his breach were mitigated to the ex-
tent of the net amount received for substitute cargo, with allowances
for expenses saved in connection with cargo not shipped by defendant
14 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336 (1), comment d (1932).
15 McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 35 (1935); quoted in Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wash. 2d
216, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956).
16 Schmidt v. New Plastic Corp., 144 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 849, 301 P.2d 131 (1956).
17 Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950).
18 Associated Lathing & Plastering Co. v. Louis C. Dunn, Inc. 135 Cal. App. 2d 40,
286 P.2d 825 (1955).
19 Guerrieri v. Severini, 51 Cal. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 635 (1958).
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and allowance for additional expenses in connection with the substi-
tute cargo.20
Certainty as to Amount of Damages
It was recently held that a judgment obtained in a federal district
court for breach of contract to buy timber must be reversed as being
based on speculation.21 It was stated by the court of appeals, that "the
law is well settled that the burden of proof is upon the party claiming
the damage to prove the elements thereof with reasonable certainty."
22
Not exactness but only reasonable certainty is required. Many
recent cases have cited and quoted the language of the California
Supreme Court in Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,23 "one whose wrongful
conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the damages cannot
escape liability because the damages cannot be measured with exact-
ness." There are numerous cases applying this doctrine.24
One of the most recent and somewhat unusual is Southern Cali-
fornia Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin.25 The plaintiff hired a salesman to
solicit business in the sale of sanitary supplies, assigning to him a spe-
cific route and providing him with information in the files as to a
large number of plaintiffs regular customers. After a few years of ser-
vice the salesman was hired by defendant, a competitor, and before
and after leaving plaintiffs employ he made use of the confidential
information in the files to secure for the defendant business which
plaintiff would otherwise have gotten. Damages were recovered from
the employer and the salesman, in part for the loss of the files abstracted
by the salesman and in part for the loss of the business and profits
therefrom. This was proved by evidence of volume of business from
the salesman's route and by a showing that plaintiff's regular customers
diverted to defendant before and after the defection. Inability to estab-
2o Isbrandtsen Co. v. Producers Cotton Oil Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 712, 322 P.2d
1005 (1958).
21 Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960), reversing 168 F. Supp. 420 (N. D.
Cal. 1958).
22 275 F.2d at 930.
2324 Cal. 2d 290, 297-298, 149 P.2d 177, 181 (1944).
24 Perry v. Lambourne, 177 Cal. App. 2d.... , 2 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1960) (breach
of agreement for a joint venture in real estate development); Tomlinson v. Wander Seed
& Bulb Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d.. . , 2 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1960); Hildebrand v. Stonecrest
Corp., 174 Cal. App. 2d 158, 344 P.2 378 (1959) (breach of agreement by shopping
center lessor of contract with lessee, a pharmacy, that no other tenant of center would
be permitted to sell drugs, medicines or cosmetics); Israel v. Campbell, 163 Cal. App.
2d 806, 330 P.2d 83 (1958) (breach of contract to sell lumber); Siquig v. West Coast
Pickle Co., 161 Cal. App. 2d 254, 326 P.2d 596 (1958) (breach of contract to buy a crop
of peppers); Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 397, 313 P.2d 936 (1957)
(contract to supply automobiles to a dealer).
25 183 Cal. App. 2d. . . , 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960).
lish the loss with exactness was no bar to the modest recovery of 1500
dollars for loss of the files and 3500 dollars for loss of business.
The court also sustained an award of punitive damages, the case
being one of fraud, although the tort incidentally involved a contract
of employment. Punitive damages appear appropriate in such a case
as mere restitution to plaintiff of defendant's unjust gain, which prob-
ably is the equivalent of plaintiff's loss, and would have no adequate
deterrent effect.
The fact that the plaintiff asking for compensation for loss of profits
has an established business and record of success is helpful in proving
his loss with a requisite degree of certainty.26
Interest as Damages*
A person entitled to a promised performance is entitled, if it is not
forthcoming when due, to damages in an amount which will compen-
sate him for the detriment proximately caused thereby. If it is not
promptly paid, if it is necessary to recover damages by litigation over
a period of months or years, the injured plaintiff suffers a detriment
by reason of the delay, the deprivation of the power to make economic
use of the compensation which is due him. The defendant receives a
corresponding enrichment through his ability to make use of a mon-
etary asset which he should turn over to the plaintiff. The usual method
of compensating the plaintiff for the loss caused by the delay is by
allowing him interest on the principal sum due him. There is a diffi-
culty in a situation where the principal sum due is not exactly ascer-
tainable until settled by trial and judgment. It may be contended that
a debtor who does not know what to pay is guilty of no wrong in
withholding payment until the amount due is judicially determined.
Accordingly the right to interest as provided by Civil Code section 3287
is limited to "damages certain or capable of being made certain by
calculation."
The leading recent case applying this code provision is Lineman
v. Schmidt.2 7 That was an action for breach of contract to sell a quan-
tity of flour of specified quality. It was in the courts for ten years. The
plaintiff at first sought to collect liquidated damages in accordance
with a provision of the contract. This was unsuccessful, the court ruling
that the liquidated damages provision was invalid under Civil Code
sections 1670 and 1871, it appearing that it was not impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damages.2s But when the plaintiff
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Gerald R. Schmelzer, member,
Second Year Class, in researching this section.
26 Mann v. Jackson, 144 Cal. App. 2d 6, 296 P.2d 120 (1956).
27 32 Cal. 2d 204, 195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R. 2d 1380 (1948).
28 Rice v. Schmidt, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 589 (1941).
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sought to fix the actual damages it was found that there was no estab-
lished market price for the brands of flour involved, therefore the
damages caused the buyer could not be "made certain by calculation."
Recovery of interest was refused.
It is submitted that the result was an injustice to the plaintiff. In
defending the code provision, section 3287, the court cited and quoted
Restatement of Contracts section 337(a). It neglected to quote or cite
section 337(b) which, in cases not within 337(a) (established market
prices being unavailable), permits the court in its discretion to allow
interest if justice requires it. This more liberal rule applies under Civil
Code section 3288 in tort actions and specifically in cases of fraud,
oppression or malice. The New York Civil Practice Act section 480, as
amended in 1927, provides that in actions for breach of contract, ex-
press or implied, "interest shall be recovered upon the principal sum
whether theretofore liquidated or unliquidated."29 This is a matter of
right, not of discretion. Such an amendment to the Civil Code should
be submitted to the California Legislature. 30
Lineman v. Schmidt has been followed in a number of cases deny-
ing interest on unliquidated claims, such as contracts for services, no
rate of pay being fixed;3 1 and for loss of profits on breach of contract
to deliver goods sold.
2
Interest is recoverable as a matter of right where the amount due
is capable of exact ascertainment, as where compensation to an em-
ployee is based on a share of clearly ascertainable profits of the enter-
prise.38 Likewise, it is recoverable in a judgment of restitution to
employer of "kickbacks" received by advertising manager from printers
and engravers,3 4 on damages suffered by a contractor for a public work
due to delays caused by fault of defendant municipal corporation,
authenticated by detailed statements furnished defendant from which
the loss could readily be computed. 3
Where plaintiff's claim, in a liquidated amount is met by a set-off or
29 See discussion of this amendment and present New York law as to recovery of
interest in Flamm v. Noble, 296 N.Y. 262, 72 N.E. 2d 886 (1947).
30 For a good critical comment on the California law as to recovery of interest, see
Comment, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 262 (1958).
31Parker v. Maier Brewing Co., 180 Cal. App. 2d .... 4 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1960);
Carrie v. McCauley, 163 Cal. App. 2d 273, 328 P.2d 1013 (1958); Brown v. Friesleban
Estate Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 720, 307 P.2d 388 (1957).
32 Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d... , 2 Cal. Rptr. 310
(1960).
3S Huntoon v. Hurlay, 137 Cal. App. 2d 33, 290 P.2d 14 (1955).
34 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 139 Cal. App. 2d 580, 294 P.2d 140 (1956).
35 Maurice L. Bein, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 157 Cal. App. 2d 670, 321 P.2d
753 (1958). This case also applies an amendment to CAL. Civ. CODE § 3287 permitting
the recovery of interest against state agencies.
counterclaim, unliquidated, the amount of which defendant establishes,
interest is recoverable on the net amount awarded to the plaintiff.36
A purchaser of real estate, induced by fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions, who gives notice of rescission and demands restitution of pay-
ment, is entitled to interest from the date of notice of rescission.
37
Damages for Fraud
Civil Code section 3343, as amended in 1935, provides as follows:
One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is
entitled to recover the difference between the actual value of that
with which the defrauded person parted with and the actual value
of that which he received, together with any additional damage aris-
ing from the particular transaction.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to deny to any person
having a cause of action for fraud or deceit any legal or equitable
remedies to which such person may be entitled.
This adoption of the "out of pocket rule" has been said to change
the law previously applied, under which the plaintiff might recover the
difference between the value of the thing bought and the value it would
have had if as represented, the "benefit of the bargain rule."38 It has,
however, been maintained that the latter rule is not excluded and
should not be, as otherwise, the defendant loses nothing by his fraud.39
Value is not necessarily market value as of the time of the wrong.
Intrinsic value may be shown, such as in the case of one fraudulently
induced to sell shares of stock.
40
There have been several cases of fraud by real estate brokers, often
in misrepresenting the price at which property is obtainable. In Cro-
gan v. Metz,41 the buyer recovered from the broker the latter's secret
profit, it being treated as an action for breach of contract. As such no
exemplary damages were recoverable.
In Ward v. Taggart,42 defendant, a broker, claimed falsely to have
an exclusive listing of property desired by the plaintiff. Plaintiff offered
to buy at a price of 4000 dollars per acre which in fact was the owner's
36Pan Pacific Sash and Door Co. v. Greendale Park, 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d
802 (1958); Muller v. Barnes, 139 Cal. App. 2d 847, 294 P.2d 505 (1956).
37 Smith v. Rickards, 149 Cal. App 2d 648, 308 P.2d 758 (1957).
38 Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 458(S.D. Cal. 1939).
- Ward v. Taggert, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 744, 336 P.2d 534, 539 (1959) (Schauer,
J., concurring and dissenting); Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 764, 192 P.2d 935,
947 (1948) (Schauer, J., dissenting); see also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 1392 (3rd ed.
1957). Justice Schauer maintains that the out-of-pocket rule as stated in CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3343 is not exclusive.
40 Zin v. Ex-Cal-Lo Corp., 24 Cal. 2d 290, 149 P.2d 177 (1944).
41 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956).
42 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); comment 11 HASTncs L.J. 183 (1959); see
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580 as to flexibility of relief under facts known at time.
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asking price. The defendant, authorized to transmit the offer, falsely
said it was declined. Plaintiff then offered 5000 dollars per acre, which
defendant said was accepted. The defendant purchased at 4000 dollars
per acre, taking title through a straw man, and then conveyed to plain-
tiff who paid him 5000 dollars per acre. After prolonged court pro-
ceedings it was ultimately held by the supreme court that the plaintiff
could recover, on the basis of waiver of tort and restitution for money
had and received, in the amount of the net profit acquired by defendant
through his fraud. The tort action for decit would not have been so
advantageous, as it appeared that the land was in reality worth 5000
dollars per acre. However, in restitution the plaintiff could recover the
defendant's unjust enrichment. It not being an obligation arising out
of contract, but one based on fraud, exemplary damages were recov-
erable. The case demonstrates effectively the advantage in some situa-
tions of basing one's case on quasi-contract or restitution rather than
deceit in cases where the defendant's gain exceeds the plaintiff's out
of pocket loss.
Garrett v. Perry 43 applies the statutory measure of damages to the
case of a sale of a ranch induced by seller's fraud, followed by fore-
closure, with no deficiency award, of a purchase money mortgage
which, as to the unpaid balance of the price, "took the buyer off the
hook." Plaintiff had agreed to buy for 700,000 dollars property actually
worth 530,000 dollars. Plaintiff initially paid 100,000 dollars in cash,
59,000 dollars on account of mortgage notes, and 30,400 dollars in ex-
penditures for care and attempted improvement of the property until
it was taken from him on foreclosure. This actual outgo of 189,400 dol-
lars was his recoverable loss, since the foreclosure operated to relieve
him from any duty to pay further on the amount deferred.
There are other recent cases permitting recovery of expenses in-
curred in the operation of a business, sold by fraud, as consequential
damages. 4
4
Fraud by a fiduciary seems, without difficulty, to entitle the de-
frauded principal to the enrichment acquired by the fiduciary. This
was the basis of recovery in Simone v. McKee 45 where a broker in-
duced his principal to sell to a straw man at a price of 13,000 dollars
not disclosing that another party had offered 17,000 dollars, to whom
the property was later sold at that price by the straw man. The secret
profit was recovered.
43 53 Cal. 2d. 178, 346 P.2d 758 (1959).
44 N. J. K. Corp. v. Pacific Vital Food Stores, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d 522, 324 P.2d
96 (1958); Lawson v. Town & Country Shops, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 2d 196, 323 P.2d 843
(1958).
45 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667 (1956).
In Prince v. Powers46 a partner in a firm engaged in dealing in
water softening equipment imposed upon his inexperienced partner,
the plaintiff, by inserting between the firm and its suppliers a dummy
corporation in which defendant and his brother were the parties in
interest. Large profits were made by billing the firm prices largely in
excess of those actually paid to the real suppliers, these profits being
split between defendant partner and his co-conspirator. In an action
for dissolution of the partnership, which naturally became insolvent,
defendant partner was held jointly and severally liable together with
his accomplice for the entire amounts of which the firm was fraudu-
lently deprived.
Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate
Damages recoverable on breach by the vendor of a contract to sell
real estate are determined under Civil Code section 3306. Excepting
cases of bad faith by the vendor, the detriment caused by his breach
is deemed to be the price paid and expense properly incurred in ex-
amining the title and preparing necessary papers, with interest.
If the vendor is guilty of bad faith in failure to perform the con-
tract, as by selling to another purchaser, he is liable in damages for
the loss of the bargain, based on the excess of the value of the property
above the sale price.
47
Fox v. Aced 48 presented an interesting problem as to what is bad
faith on the part of the vendor. The contract contemplated that a
building in course of construction should be completed before per-
formance. It was not completed within the time specified. The vendor
was advised by his attorney that the completion was a condition and
not having occurred the deal was off, consequently the vendor refused
to perform. The majority of the supreme court held that acting on ad-
vice of counsel precluded any implication of bad faith, although the
advice was erroneous. A strong dissent 49 by Carter J., in which Gibson
and Traynor JJ. concurred, viewed the evidence, as did the trial court,
as not showing a full and fair disclosure of the facts to defendant's
counsel, and so good faith was lacking.
The defaulting vendee is liable for the difference between the con-
tract price and whatever lesser value the property has at the time of
breach. 50
46 177 Cal. App. 2d..., 2 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1960).
47 Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App. 2d 755, 301 P.2d 9 (1956); Ras-
mussen v. Moe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 499, 292 P.2d 226 (1956).
48 49 Cal. 2d 381, 317 P.2d 608 (1957).
49 49 Cal. 2d at 386, 317 P.2d at 611.
ro Bouehard v. Orange, 177 Cal. App. 2d..., 2 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1960); Van Buskirk
v. McClenahan, 163 Cal. App. 2d 633, 329 P.2d 924 (1958).
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Liquidated Damages and Penalties
A significant decision as to the validity and enforcibility of a liqui-
dated damage clause in a contract is McCarthy v. Tally.51 A lease of
summer resort property contained a provision that in the event of
termination of the lease by the lessor for cause, or abandonment by
the lessee, the sum of 10,000 dollars was fixed as liquidated damages.
There was a non-payment of rent during the off-season and abandon-
ment by the lessee. The superior court had denied recovery under the
liquidated damage clause as actual damage at the time of the breach
was not shown.
In reversing the judgment, the supreme court doubted that the
clause was intended to apply to the breach during the off-season, or
if it was, whether the amount fixed was reasonable. But final disposi-
tion of the case could not be made in the absence of findings on these
points. The significant part of the decision is a ruling that if the agree-
ment for liquidated damages was valid when entered into, as a rea-
sonable effort to determine damages which would be impracticable or
extremely difficult to ascertain with certainty, it would be valid and
enforcible even though there was no proof of actual damage caused by
the breach. This may be in accordance with the weight of authority
in other jurisdictions,52 but it seems questionable whether such a ruling
is in accord with the purpose of damages, which is compensation. 53 To
allow recovery by one who has not been harmed seems like judicially
collecting a bet.
In Los Angeles City School District v. Landier Management Cor-
poration 54 a question was presented of liquidated damages or penalty.
By statute the district was entitled to recover amounts in excess of
1,500,000 dollars paid for transportation of pupils because members
of the governing board of the school district had an interest in the
transporting company. A suit having been instituted and prepared for
trial, it became apparent that if successful the company would be
thrown into bankruptcy. An executory accord agreement was entered
into and embodied in a stipulation to the effect that 264,000 dollars
should be paid in eight annual installments, and in the event of a thirty
day period of default in payment of any installment, after thirty days
notice, judgment should be entered for twice the unpaid balance. De-
fault occurred four years later and an application was made by the
company to avoid the stipulation on the ground of mistake of law, it
51 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956).
5 2 Note, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 126 (1956).
53 Note, 61 Hiv. L. REv. 113, 130 (1947).
5' 177 Cal. App. 2d..., 2 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1960).
being invalid as a penalty. The court denied relief from the stipulation
because the application was not timely and entered judgment pursuant
to its terms. As a dictum the court indicated the stipulation was orig-
inally vulnerable as a penalty.
This seems questionable. If an executory accord is not performed
the original claim should be considered revived in full force. 55 An
agreement to accept much less than what might have been recovered,
but for the stipulation by way of compromise, does not seem to in-
volve a penalty.
Related to the problem of liquidated damages is that of forfeiture
by the defaulting buyer of property; where his payment already made
exceeds the actual damages caused to the seller. Barkis v. Scott 51 and
Baffa v. Johnson 57 allowed recovery of the excess by a vendee of real
estate whose default was neither wilful, fraudulent, nor grossly negli-
gent under Civil Code section 3275. Freedman v. Rector of St. Ma-
thias Parish 58 went further and enforced a duty of restitution of unjust
enrichment on the seller, even though the buyer's breach appeared to
be wilful, citing Civil Code sections 1670, 1671, 3294, and 3369. This
decision has been followed in later cases. 59
This principle was extended to a default by the vendee in a condi-
tional sale of a chattel, in Bird v. Kenworthy.60 But in that case the
rental value of the chattel while in the possession of the vendee ex-
ceeded his payment; consequently there was no forfeiture suffered
by him nor unjust enrichment received by the vendor, therefore no
recovery.
In a quiet title action brought by a vendor, the defaulting vendee,
seeking a return of his payments or a portion thereof, has the burden
of proving that his payments exceed the damages to the vendor, and
to what extent.61
Conclusion
The writer's impressions from examining the decisions heretofor
noted are several. The plaintiff's theory of his case does not limit his
measure of recovery. The court may sustain a recovery on any theory
which fits the facts, whether in breach of contract, quasi contract or
55 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 417(c) (1932).
56 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
57 35 Cal. 2d 36,216 P.2d 13 (1950).
58 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
5 9 Fry v. George Elkins Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 256, 327 P.2d 905 (1958); Crofoot
v. Wager, 109 Cal. App. 2d 839, 241 P.2d 1017 (1952).
60 43 Cal. 2d 656, 277 P.2d 1 (1954).
61 Pasteur Realty Corp. v. LaFleur, 154 Cal. App. 2d 5, 315 P.2d 374 (1957); Peter-
son v. Ridenaur, 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955).
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trespass, and an appellate court will adopt whatever appropriate theory
sustains the award of a trial court. Under the heading of detriment
proximately caused by breach of contract, foreseeable damages, as for
loss of profits, are recoverable. The proof of the harm caused need not
be more than with a reasonable degree of certainty, it being the de-
fendant's fault that exact proof is impossible. The statutes dealing
with interest prior to judgment on claims for breach of contract are
unduly severe, resulting in injustice to the plaintiff and should be made
more liberal as to damages incapable of precise liquidation. The deter-
mining of the validity and the applicability of a liquidated damage
clause in a contract in the light of circumstances and harms capable of
anticipation at the time of contracting, when the actual harm resulting
from the breach is merely nominal, is illogical as applied in an action
seeking compensation.
